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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED G. JENSEN and 
MIRIAM D. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellants 
vs. 
RAY L. NIELSEN and 
MABEL W. NIELSEN, 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents agree with the Appellants' brief as to 
the nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Respondents agree with the Appellants' brief as 
to the disposition in the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the Order of the lower 
court affirmed on the grounds set forth in the Order 
as well as the additional grounds stated herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellants brought an action in February, 
1965 in the Sixth Judicial District Court for Garfield 
County, Utah, seeking restitution based on Respond-
ents alleged unjust enrichment. 
Under contract the Respondents sold to the Ap-
pellants their motel property located in Panguitch, 
Utah, known as Nelson's motor Court (R-1-6). The 
contract was signed about July 1, 1958, the 
Appellants paying $10,150.00 down, and taking pos-
session. From the beginning the appellants were de-
linquent in their payments on the contract. They did, 
however, make payments on the contract until Decem-
ber 1, 1961, but during that time had failed 
to pay all the property taxes as they became due ( R-39-
40). The appellants made substantial changes in the 
motel property, which rather than improved the prop-
erty reduced its value (R-9). 
The appellants were in possession of the property 
for a period of six to seven months after default in pay-
ments, before the respondents, under the provisions of 
the contract rescinded the same and removed the con-
' tract documents from escrow. 
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The appel~ants then vacated the premises and the 
Respondents did not hear from them again until 196o 
when they were sued for $15,000.00. A period of more 
t~an two and one-half years (R-1-6). Respondents' 
filed an Answer and Counter Claim, and various pro-
ceedings were had. Finally in May, 1967, Appellan~ 
gave Notice of taking the deposition of Mr. T. H. Heal 
on Written Interrogatories and at this point the reconl 
becomes confused ( R-28-29). 
Mr. Durham Morris, representing the Respond-
ents, propounded Cross Interrogatories to Mr. T. H. 
Heal, which was filed on April 10, 1967, nearly a month 
prior to the time Appellants claim Notice of Interroga· 
tories was given, and more than four months prior t-0 
the time the record shows that Appellants' Notice to the 
Respondents was filed (R-25-27). The Cross Interroga· 
tories were never propounded to Mr. Heal, as it clearly 
shown by the said deposition ( R-32-35). 
The Cross Interrogatories also state that they are 
to be propounded to Mr. Heal at his deposition to be 
taken before Shirley Huffaker in Mesa, Arizona, and 
pursuant to Notice of Taking Written Interrogatories 
heretofore filed and served upon attorney for defend· 
ants (R-25). The interesting fact is that nowhere in the 
record of the Court does any Notice appear, except the 
one filed August 29, 1967 at the time Summary Judg· 
ment was taken. 
On August 14, 1967 Appellants served Notice of 
Motion for Summary Judgment upon the defenda~t. 
There is no doubt that the Respondents received notice 
of the hearing, although there is considerable question 
as to whether the Respondents were aware of just what 
the nature of the hearing would be ( R-59-63). It should 
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be further noted that although the filing date of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment is August 15, 1967, 
the number 15 is superimposed in ink over what ap-
pears to be a 29 made by the Clerk's official stamp 
(R-38). 
The defendants failed to appear and the plaintiff's 
took Summary Judgment on August 29, 1967. 
At the same time the Summary Judgment was taken 
th plaintiffs also apparently filed the following papers: 
i\otice of Taking Deposition (R-38), Direct Interroga-
tories (R-30), Answers to Written Interrogatories by 
Deposition ( R-32), Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R-38), and Reply to Defendant's Request for Admis-
sion of Fact ( R-39). 
The plaintiffs subsequently garnished the defend-
ants' bank account, and the defendants' thereafter 
moved to Vacate the Judgment under Rule 60( b) 
(1 J Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R-47-48). The 
Coul't vacated the Summary Judgment on the grounds 
that there was mistake, surprise and excusable neglect, 
and that the court should have taken evidence to justify 
the Judgment (R-89-90). 
For the reasons set forth hereafter the Respond-
ents seek to have the court's decision affirmed. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS HAD NOT FAILED TO GIVE 
PROPER NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS IN RE-
GARDS TO THE WITHDRAW AL OF ATTORNEYS. 
Counsel for Appellants has argued that Section 
78-51-36, Utah Code Anno., 1953 does not apply in the 
instant case because this section is applicable only 
where the withdrawing attorney ceases the practice of 
-5-
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law. Counsel cites Vancott vs. Wall 53 Utah 282, 1n 
P. ~3 and 42 A.L.R. 134 7 as authority for this con. 
tent10n. · 
Without disputing the holding of the above auth. 
o:it! it ~hould be noted that the instant case is clearly 
d1stmgmshable from either the VanCott case or any of 
the cases cited in 42 ALR 1347. 
All of the cases relied on by Appellants deal with 
the requirements of Notice where the attorney had 
withdrawn immediately before the trial or hearing upon 
which judgment was granted. In the present case, the 
last attorney to represent the Respondents prior to 
Summary Judgment was M. Durham Morris, Cedar 
City, Utah. Mr. Morris withdrew as attorney for De· 
fendants in May of 1967. This was more than three 
months prior to the Notice of Motion for Summary 
Judgment ( R-37), and the Appellants had sufficient 
time in that period to give the required notice. 
A reading of the cases involving this point shows 
that the clear intent of the decisions is to prevent un· 
necessary delay and injustice. That problem is not even 
remotely present here. On the contrary the injustice 
and any delay is now due to the appellants' failure to 
give proper Notice. 
Appellants do cite one case in which the with· 
drawal of counsel was a short time prior to the Judg· 
ment taken, Se<!urity Adjustment Bureau, Inc. vs. West 
20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P2d 214. In that case, however, 
the courts only comment on this point was that the 
VanCott Case was controlling. The court set aside the 
Judgment on other grounds, which made the questi~n 
of notice to appoint new counsel moot. Justice ~enro1d 
who wrote the opinion suggested that the rule m Van 
-6-
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Cott may be subject to some legitimate criticism and 
analysis. Respondents would certainly agree. 
The rule in the V anCott case seems to render Sec-
tion 78-51-36 useless. One wonders why it is important 
to require Notice if an attorney dies, is removed, sus-
pended or retires from practice, but not if he merely 
withdraws. The client is just as much without an attor-
ney. Much has been said in other cases about an at-
torney not being able to withdraw without the consent 
of the court, but the same reasoning should be true in 
case the attorney retires from practice. There seems to 
be no clear cut reason for requiring notice of with-
drawal and demand for appointing new counsel in some 
situations and not others. Section 78-51-35 Utah Code 
Anno. 1953 requires an attorney to recognize the at-
torney for the adverse party until he is notified of a 
change, and apparently this applies in all situations. 
Sali11a Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemin, 76 Utah 372, 290 
P. 161 at pages 377-78. Why then should not Section 
78-51-36 apply in all cases? 
In the present case the appellants were fully 
aware the respondents were not represented by coun-
sel, yet in a three-month period they never gave the 
defendants any notice or demand to appoint a new at-
torney. It is suggested that such an effort on the part of 
the appellants might have avoided the present appeal. 
The proper rule for the court to follow under Sec-
tion 78-51-36 would seem to be that where no injustice 
will result because of undue delay, notice to appoint 
counsel should be required in all situations. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD AS SET FORTH IN PLAIN-
TIFFS' AND DEFENDANTS' DESIGNATION OF 
-7-
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RECORD ON APPEAL IS EVIDENCE TO sup. 
PORT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT THAT 
THERE WAS MISTAKE, SURPRISE AND EX-
CUSABLE NEGLECT ON THE PART OF THE DE. 
FENDANTS IN NOT APPEARING FOR THE 
HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT ON AUGUST 29, 1967, WHEN 
CONSIDERED WITH THE DEFENDANTS' AFFI-
DAVIT AND THAT OF NORMAN H. JACKSON 
' COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS. 
In Point I of their Brief, Counsel for Appellants 
state that although the Order Setting Aside and Vacat-
ing Summary Judgment recites a finding of mistake~ 
surprise, and excusable neglect the court in fact did not 
make any such finding at the hearing. The record of 
that hearing clearly indicates that there was mistake, 
surprise and excusable neglect. 
The Respondent Mabel W. Nielsen testified as 
follows: 
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) Mrs. Nielsen, did you 
understand that there would be a hearingtake 
place on August 29, which would be the trial 
of this cause in which this court would be 
asked for a Judgment against you?" 
"A. I didn't understand there was any-
thing pertaining to a Judgment against us. I 
was notified that there would be a trial or a 
hearing at that time, yes." 
"Q. Did you understand that it would be 
the trial and it would be the time that the 
rights of the parties both Plaintiff and D~­
fendant would be settled and a formal and fi-
nal judgment entered in this cause?" 
-8-
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"A. I certainly did not." (R-60) 
"Q. (Mr. Jackson) Notice of Motion for 
Summary Judgment?" 
"A. No, I don't know anything about a 
Summary Judgment. Whatever the case was 
on the 29th, I know I received a copy. 
"Q. You know you received a Notice of 
some hearing on the 29th?" 
"A. And I had no understanding of any 
Summary Judgment or anything of that sort." 
(R-64). 
Mrs. Nielsen's testimony clearly indicates that al-
though she understood there would be a hearing on 
August 29, 1968, she was not aware of the nature of 
the proceedings and definately did not understand 
there would be a judgment taken against her. 
As to whether Mr. Nielsen was aware of the na-
ture of the hearing Mrs. Nielsen further testified: 
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) Mrs. Nielsen, what I am 
after, to your knowledge has your husband's 
condition, mental condition at times caused 
him to misunderstand what people have told 
him?" 
"A. Yes." (R-61). 
"THE COURT: Just tell us what the 
condition was." 
"A. My husband has had a severe heart 
condition for sometime. The primary reason 
we sold our court in the first place is because 
things do upset him unduly because of that 
condition." ... 
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) When he is in this con-
dition, will you describe his actions?" 
-9-
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"A. Well, other than what I have said I 
don't know how I would describe his actions. 
He is upset. It is difficult for him to work the 
thing through as other people would see it that 
way." (R-62). 
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) Mrs. Nielsen did you 
receive any notice advising you to be in Court 
on August 29, 1967?" 
"A. Yes, I did." 
"Q. Was your husband able to physically 
appear to Court on that date?" 
"A. No, I don't think he was." (R-63). 
Mrs. Nielsen's testimony clearly indicates further 
that. Mr. Nielsen because of his health did not under-
stand the nature of the hearing on August 29, 1968. 
This is certainly evidence from which the court 
in its discretion could find mistake. One cannot help 
but think that this problem would never have arisen 
had the appellants given notice to appoint Counsel. 
The facts above stated would clearly place the 
case within the rule laid down by this court in Mayhew 
v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 U 2d 52, 376 P 2d 951 
where the Court said: 
"It is undoubtedly correct that the trial 
court is endowed with considerable latitude of 
discretion in granting or denying such mo-
tions. However, it is true that the court cannot 
act arbitrarily in that regard, but should be 
generally indulgent toward permitting full 
inquiry and knowledge of dispute so they can 
be settled advisedly and in conformity with 
law and justice. To clamp a judgment rigidly 
and irrevocably on a party without a hearing 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing. It 
it fundamental in our system of justice that 
each party to a controversy should be afford-
ed an opportunity to present his side of the 
case. For that reason it is quite uniformly re-
garded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where there is rea-
sonable justification or excuse for the defend-
ant's failure to appear and timely applica-
tion is made to set it aside." 
A review of the affidavits of the parties further 
shows the court was justified in setting the Judgment 
aside. The defendant Ray L. Nielsen states in his Affi-
davit (R-49, 50) that he had been ill and under a doc-
tor's care for a nervous condition, that during his con-
versation with Norman H. Jackson, attorney for plain-
tiffs he became confused, and uncertain as to the mean-
ing of the hearing on August 29, 1967, and that he 
further informed Mr. Jackson he had made prior plans 
to go to Nevada on the day of the hearing and could 
not be in attendance. 
The affidavit of Norman H. Jackson confirms 
that of the defendant as to the trip to Nevada (R-52) 
and further shows that Mr. Nielsen could clearly have 
been confused. 
Mr. Jackson knew that Mr. Nielsen planned to go 
to Nevada on the day of the hearing and knowing this 
he pressed for Summary Judgment. 
Having informed Mr. Jackson he was going to 
Nevada on August 29, it was certainly not unreason-
able to believe that Mr. Jackson would forego taking a 
Judgment at that time if the defendant was not pres-
ent. This would clearly have to be considered excusable 
neglect. 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally the record itself indicates the court was 
not acting unduly in setting aside the Judgment. 
No less than four different papers were filed in 
this matter on August 29, 1967, or later which should 
have properly been in the record prior to that date. It 1 
appears that the Notice of taking of Depositions on 
Written Interrogatories may have been filed October 
24, 1967, nearly two months after the court granted 
Summary Judgment ( R-80). A trained lawyer on 
looking at the file for the first time would have been 
confused from the record as it appeared on August 
29, 1967. Certainly an ordinary layman would be sub· 
ject to confusion also where he had no legal counsel to 
advise him. 
In short there was ample evidence for the Court 
to determine that there was mistake and excusable 
neglect on the part of the defendants and to vacate the 
judgment previously granted. 
The mere fact that the court did not say it speci· 
fically found the mistake, surprise and excusable neg· 
lect at the time of the hearing should not be controlling 
here. 
POINT III 
THAT THE JUDGMENT GRANTED BY THE 
COURT WAS NOT BASED ON ANY EVIDENCE 
OR DAMAGE, THERE WERE NO FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND THE COURT AT NO TIME WAS OF· 
FERED OR RECEIVED ANY EVIDENCE UPON 
WHICH TO BASE THE ALLEGED JUDGMENT 1 
GRANTED. 
The appellants contend that this point was. not 
properly before the Court and could not be determrned 
by the court at that time, and that under Rule 7 (b) (1) 
-12-
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, only motions which are 
incidental to the Orderly progress of the proceedings 
may be made orally. The defendants claim this is pure 
conjecture and that there is no basis in law for the 
theory they assert. Rule l(a) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides as follows: 
" ( 1) They shall be liberally constructed 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action." 
Rule 7(b) (1) would allow unwritten motions to 
be made during hearing or trial. Counsel for defend-
ants made a motion at the time of the hearing based 
upon the original motion filed with the court and upon 
other matters in the file which he would bring before 
the court ( R-58-59). After having concluded his exam-
ination of Mrs. Nielsen, counsel for defendants then 
brought the other matters in the file to the attention 
of the Court ( R-7 4). This was an oral motion to the 
court and did not need to be in writing. Aside from 
this the written motion clearly stated that it was based 
upon the Notice, the defendant's affidavit, the pro-
visions of Rules 60 and 62 of the Utah Rules and the 
evidence and testimony of the defendants to be offered 
at the hearing (R-47). Respondents assert that under 
Rule l(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Howard 
v. Howard 11U2d149, 356 P2d 275 this was all that 
was required. 
Even if the Appellant's contentions as to the na-
ture of Rule 7 ( b) ( 1) are correct the respondent asserts 
that the motions and grounds stated by defendant's 
counsel at the hearing were fully incidental to the or-
derly progress of the proceedings. 
Any confusion which resulted at the time of the 
-13-
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hearing was not due to any of the acts of defendant's \ 
counsel. I 
. T~e appell~nts also state that taking of evidence I 
to Justify the Judgment was not necessary, since the 
record shows the motions for Summary Judgment were I 
made and granted on the basis of defendants' admis-
sions a deposition and the complete files and records 
in the action. 
This is not so. First of all the defendants never 
admitted anything except by failure to answer plain-
tiff's request for admissions. Under Rule 36(a) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure matters not denied in the re-
quested admissions within 10 days are deemed ad-
mitted. This, however, seems hardly the type of admis-
sion on which a Summary Judgment should be allowed, 
especially when a look at the record shows that the Re· 
quest for Admissions was filed at about the time the 
defendants were between attorneys. (R 10 and 51). 
As to the deposition, the record shows that this 
was never filed until August 29, 1967, at the time of 
the hearing ( R-32), and, there is some conjecture as 
to whether it was even filed at that time. It is also 
questionable as to whether it was ever published as 
evidence on August 29, 1967 (R-78). 
As to the record of the hearing on August 29, 1967 
all we have is a statement of Proceeding (R-41-49), and 
no actual "transcript," that being lost. The statement 
was prepared by the counsel for Plaintiffs and is cer· 
tainly self-serving. It is directly in conflict with the 
transcript of the proceedings had on December 21, 
1967 (R-78). 
The plaintiffs have further contended that ~he 
trial court erred in that it considered it was settmg 
-14-
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aside a default judgment rather than a Summary 
Judgment (R-81, 82, 83). While the plaintiffs are 
technically correct, the defendants respectfully contend 
that the court did not in actuality err and that the 
hearing on August 29, 1968 was in a sense a default 
matter. 
The defendants were not represented by counsel, 
and notice of the hearing had been given. There being 
no one present at that time to contest the actions of 
plaintiff, it really went by default. On this basis the 
court's finding that it should have taken evidence is not 
unreasonable, especially when considered in the light of 
the state of the record at the time of the hearing as 
refened to above. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN VACATING 
AND SETTING ASIDE THE SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT 
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT AND 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
This last point is really the sum and substance of 
this appeal. The entire matter really boils down to 
whether the defendants have been given their day in 
court. 
In the conclusion of the Appellants' Brief oppos-
ing counsel contends that this matter is not proper 
in this appeal because it is raised here for the first 
time. This is just plainly not so. 
First of all in their motion and notice to set aside 
the Summary Judgment the defendants state that the 
motion is based upon, among other things, the Affi-
davit of the Defendant Ray L. Nielsen (R-47). A re-
-15-
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view of the Affidavit shows that Mr. Nielsen claimed 
he was not indebted to the Plaintiffs and that he had a 
good and meritorious defense to the action ( R-50). This 
is just the same as saying there are genuine issues of 
fact. Under Howard vs. Howard previously cited, the 
fact that the motion states it is based upon the Affi. 
davit is sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the 
fact that this point would be relied upon in an effort 
to have the Judgment vacated . 
Further this matter was referred to and relied 
upon in the hearing on December 21, 1967, as the fo]. 
lowing clearly indicates: 
"Q. (Mr. Tibbs) Have you been advised 
by counsel that you had a meritorious defense 
to this action that was commenced by the 
Jensens. 
"A. (Mrs. Nielsen) Yes." 
"Q. Have you ever had your day in court 
to put on your defense?" 
"A. Never" (R-70-71). 
(The Court) [I] am aware of that mind 
you as well as counsel for Plaintiffs, but de-
spite that simply because we have exhausted 
our patience is enough to deprive a litigant 
of his day in court ... but this counsel now 
contends that he has a meritorious defense to 
this court, and the Judgment is a sizable sum 
of money ... " (R-79). 
The foregoing clearly shows that this point was 
properly before the court at the December 21st hear· 
ing and that it was considered and relied upon at that 
time. 
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As to the merits of this Point let us see if there are 
any genuine issues of fact. 
Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment states 
it is based upon all of the files and records herein, in-
cluding the pleadings and admissions of Defendants 
and Answers to Written Interrogatories by Deposition 
on file ( R-38). This motion was filed on August 15, 
1967. At that time the deposition wasn't even in the file. 
This aside, however, let us look at all the record. 
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint charging the defend-
ants were unjustly enriched when the plaintiffs de-
faulted on a real estate sales contract and the defend-
ants repossessed pursuant to said contract (R-1-6). 
The defendants answered by denying any unjust en-
richment and further stated that the plaintiffs were 
not timely in bringing any action for any relief they 
might have been entitled to (R-7-9). 
The plaintiffs filed a Request for Admissions 
which Defendants never answered (R-10-12). All this 
does, however, is put us back to where the parties were 
at the time of the Complaint and Answer. 
If the defendants failure to answer to admissions 
is taken as an admission there is still no more before 
the court than at the time the defendants filed their 
answer. That means the defendants still deny any un-
just enrichment and there is still a question of whether 
the plaintiffs were timely in their action. 
The Defendants thereafter filed a Request for Ad-
missions ( R-22) which Plaintiffs answered but which 
were never filed until August 29, 1967. A reading of 
these items again shows that the matter is still at issue. 
The Plaintiffs then gave notice of deposition by 
written Interrogatories (R-28). Prior to this the de-
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fendants had filed cross Interrogatories (R-25-27). As. 
has been previously stated, how these Interrogatories 1 
got in the order they did and what happened to the 
deposition which was to be taken before Shirley Huff. 
aker is not shown from the record. It is clear, however,, 
that they were on file and that the Plaintiff's counsel• 
I 
never asked the deponent T. H. Heal the questions in· 
the Defendant's Interrogatories. 1 
A reading of the deposition shows only that Mr. 
Heal examined the property and the value he appraised 
it at. There is nothing in the deposition to show the 
value of the property at the time of the contract, 
whether the appraised value was due to improvements 
by the plaintiffs or even the exact date of the appraisal. 
There is certainly nothing to show any unjust enrich· 
ment. Had the Defendants' Interrogatories been put 
to Mr. Heal at that time there might have been some 
question as to the appraised value. 
Thus at the time of the Summary Judgment we 
have the following facts: ( 1) a contract to buy real · 
property, (2) default in payment by the Buyer, (3) I 
repossession by the sellers, and that is all that is clear. ! 
Plaintiffs say there was unjust enrochment be· I 
cause they made improvements. Defendants deny 
there were any improvements and further say that 
any rights the plaintiffs may have had were lost 
because they were not timely in their action. 
Is this the type of case that can be determined on I 
motior1 for Summary Judgment? Obviously there were i 
genuine issues of fact which could only be settled by a I 
trial on the merits. ! 
On a motion for Summary Judgment the Court is I 
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to him against whom it is directed. Welchman vs. Wood 
9 U 2d 25, 337 P 2d 410. Certainly viewed in the light 
most favorable to the defendant in this case a Summary 
Judgment was not proper, and the court in vacating the 
Judgment was acting reasonable and within the law. 
The Appellants apparently believe that from the 
law and the facts they were entitled to a Summary 
Judgment. A careful examination of the records shows 
that the facts are still in dispute. Even if they were not, 
however, the Respondents contend that the law would 
not entitle the plaintiffs to a Summary Judgment. At 
the time of the hearing for Summary Judgment counsel 
for Appellants apparently cited four cases to the court 
which they contended gave them the right to Summary 
Judgment under the law. Respondents assert that these 
cases do not support the appellants theory. 
While a defaulting purchaser in Utah may recover 
the excess of his payments over the vendors' damages, 
3 U L. R. 30 at Page 40 the forfeiture provision in 
contracts must allow such an unconscionable and exor-
bitant benefit to be retained by the Seller which bears 
no relationship to the damages which the Seller has sus-
tained or reasonably could have contemplated. Jacobson 
vs. Swan 3 U 2d 59, 278 P. 2d 294. 
This is something which cannot be determined by 
Summary Judgment, especially in this case. There was 
no where any proof or evidence as to the rental value 
of the property. Nor was there any real showing of the 
value of the property at the time of the repossession. 
Also there was never any determination of the defend-
ant's damages, nor any determination as to whether 
the plaintiff was timely in bringing the action. 
In short, there were just too many issues and loose 
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~n?s t_o allo~ a Summary Judgment without a terrible 
1IlJUStlce bemg done to the Defendants. 
. Final!y, ~ Summary Judgment was not proper in 
1 
this case m hght of the record, because as this Court 1 
has said before, · 
"Summary Judgment is a drastic rem-
edy and courts should be reluctant to deprive 
Utigants of an opportunity to fully present 
their contentions upon a trial. It should be 
granted only when under the facts viewed in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff he 
could not recover as a matter of law." Welch-
man vs. Wood 9 U 2d 25, 337 P2d 410, also see 
Housley vs. Anaconda Co. 19 U2d 124, 427 
P2d 390. 
That simply is not the case here. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondents contend that because of the state 
of the record and the facts as they actually existed that 
the court acted correctly in vacating the Order for Sum· 
mary Judgment. 
The record was in a state of confusion, there was 
clearly mistake and excusable neglect on the part of the 
defendants in not appearing at the trial. There are 
genuine issues off act which can only be determined by 
a trial on the merits. 
The Respondents ask only that they be given their 
day in Court and that they have the opportunity to pre· 
sent a defense to the charges of Appellants at that time. 
If the contention of the appellant is just they have 1' 
nothing to fear from a trial on the merits. The check 
they secured under Writ of Garnishment is still in the 
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hands of the Court and would be available if they pre-
vail at trial. On the other hand, if the appellant's con-
tention is not just then the Respondents', who are elder-
ly people, will lose their life savings and suffer an un-
just economic set-back by the court reversing the deci-
sion of the trial court and reinstating the judgment. 
For these reasons Respondents ask this honorable 
court to affirm the decision of the trial court and to 
remand this matter to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TIBBS & TERVORT 
50 North Main 
Manti, Utah 
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